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95 N.C. L. REV. 1293 (2017)

Healing Medicare: Enforcing Administrative Law Deadlines in
Medicare Appeals*

INTRODUCTION
The United States health-care system revolves around a small
number of powerful actors, including insurers, providers, and patients.
To date, many attempts at health-care reform have merely shifted costs
from one group to another. One such attempt occurred in 2010, when
the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) in the
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS) implemented the
Recovery Audit Contractor (“RAC”) program.1 While the program
successfully reduced overpayments to hospitals paid by Medicare,2 it
also led to an unprecedented rise in appeals of Medicare payment
decisions by health-care providers.3 Because of this rise in appeals, there
is a significant backlog at the Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals
(“OMHA”).4 As of 2015, it would take ten years for OMHA to
adjudicate every case currently before it and the appeals backlog is only
growing larger.5
Frustrated with this delay, some providers have filed motions in the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit6 and the U.S. Court of

*
© 2017 Stephen C. Robin.
1. Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., CMS Announces New Recovery
Audit Contract to Help Identify Improper Medicare Payments (Oct. 6, 2008), https://www.cms
.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-Sheets/2008-Fact-Sheets-Items/2008-10-06.html
[http://perma.cc/J48L-5ZFZ]. See generally Mary Squire, Comment, RAC: A Program in
Distress, 2015 B.Y.U. L. REV. 291 (2015) (providing more information on the history and the
initial negative consequences of the RAC program).
2. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., RECOVERY AUDITING IN MEDICARE
FEE-FOR-SERVICE FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015, at 14 (2016), https://www.cms.gov/ResearchStatistics-Data-and-Systems/Monitoring-Programs/Medicare-FFS-Compliance-Programs
/Recovery-Audit-Program/Downloads/FY2015-Medicare-FFS-RAC-Report-to-Congress
.pdf [http://perma.cc/NU69-P55G] (reporting that the RAC program corrected $1.6 billion in
overpayments in the 2014 fiscal year and $141 million in the 2015 fiscal year).
3. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HHS PRIMER: THE MEDICARE
APPEALS PROCESS 3 (2015), https://www.hhs.gov/dab/medicare-appeals-backlog.pdf [http://
perma.cc/BMN3-BGPP].
4. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, 816 F.3d 48, 50–51 (4th Cir. 2016).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 57 (denying jurisdiction for a hospital’s claim of mandamus to compel OMHA
to hear its ongoing Medicare appeals).
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Appeals for the District of Columbia7 seeking to compel OMHA to hear
their appeals. The two circuits reached divergent conclusions due to
different views on the enforceability of agency deadlines when
alternative remedies are present, such as the option to escalate the claim
to the next level of appeal.8 The Fourth Circuit viewed the appeals as
part of a “coherent regulatory scheme,” and thus not independently
enforceable by mandamus.9 The D.C. Circuit concluded that escalation
is not an “adequate alternative remedy[,]” so mandamus is available.10
To answer the question of whether the courts should enforce OMHA’s
statutorily imposed ninety-day deadline to adjudicate each appeal, it is
necessary to address Congress’s rationale for providing intermediate
deadlines in the Medicare appeals system and to evaluate possible
solutions to the current backlog.
The D.C. Circuit’s decision to recognize the jurisdictional grounds
for mandamus is essential to solving the problem, despite potentially
significant consequences. Congress is pulling CMS in two separate
directions by requiring CMS to implement the RAC program, yet failing
to allocate funds necessary for OMHA to meet statutory appeals
deadlines. Unless Congress increases funding, OMHA will have to
implement one or more of the following changes: (1) significantly
changing the RAC program, (2) altering the procedural rights
guaranteed through the appeals process, or (3) allowing the backlog to
grow even larger. This Recent Development argues that the D.C.
Circuit’s decision to address the Medicare appeals process as a whole,
instead of confining its analysis to just one hospital’s rights, is necessary
to effectuate the intent of the governing legislation and reduce the
Medicare appeals backlog.
Analysis proceeds in three parts. Part I explains the factors that
must be present to allow a court to enforce an agency deadline through
mandamus. Part I then addresses the Fourth Circuit and D.C. Circuit
decisions, Cumberland County Hospital System, Inc. v. Burwell11 and
American Hospital Ass’n v. Burwell.12 Part II examines common reasons
courts avoid granting mandamus in cases of agency inaction, and then
concludes by piecing together when and how courts should enforce
agency deadlines, particularly when remedies such as escalation are
7. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 192 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (finding jurisdiction
for the district court to address the equities of hospitals’ claims for mandamus).
8. See Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d at 55; Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 192.
9. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d at 56 (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513
U.S. 561, 569 (1995)).
10. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 192; see infra Section I.D.
11. 816 F.3d 48 (4th Cir. 2016).
12. 812 F.3d 183 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
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available. Part III recommends steps each branch should take to resolve
this issue and discusses the possible consequences from taking such
actions.
I. PETITIONS FOR MANDAMUS RELIEF FROM THE MEDICARE
APPEALS BACKLOG
Mandamus relief compels a government agency or official to act
when the claimant demonstrates a “clear and indisputable right to
relief[.]”13 Both Cumberland County and American Hospital Ass’n
involved hospital systems seeking to compel OMHA to abide by the
statutorily imposed Medicare appeals deadlines.14 This Part provides a
brief overview of the mandamus remedy, an outline of the multi-level
Medicare appeals framework, and an introduction of the facts and legal
reasoning behind both Cumberland County and American Hospital
Ass’n.
A. Factors Courts Consider When Evaluating Mandamus Claims
Mandamus is a drastic remedy, “invoked only in extraordinary
circumstances.”15 For a district court to have jurisdiction over a
mandamus claim, the “plaintiff[] must demonstrate (1) a clear and
indisputable right to relief, (2) that the government agency or official is
violating a clear duty to act, and (3) that no adequate alternative remedy
exists.”16 Once those threshold requirements are met, the merits of
mandamus are judged by the six TRAC factors, so-called because they
were first articulated in Telecommunications Research & Action Center
v. FCC (TRAC).17 The TRAC factors include considering the effects of
mandamus on other agency activities and a timetable for agency action
that is “governed by a ‘rule of reason[.]’ ”18 When applied, the
13. Id. at 189 (citing United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 532 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).
14. Id. at 185; Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d at 49.
15. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 189 (quoting Power v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 781, 784 (D.C.
Cir. 2002)).
16. Id. (citing United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 532 (D.C. Cir. 2011)); see United
States ex rel. Rahman v. Oncology Assocs., P.C., 198 F.3d 502, 511 (4th Cir. 1999).
17. 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
18. Id. at 80 (quoting Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. ICC, 702 F.2d 1026, 1034 (D.C. Cir.
1983)). The full list of TRAC factors are as follows:
(1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a “rule of
reason,” . . . (2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the
speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that
statutory scheme may supply content for this rule of reason, . . . (3) delays that might
be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human
health and welfare are at stake, . . . (4) the court should consider the effect of
expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing
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jurisdictional and equitable inquiries essentially merge, and the district
court considers both questions at the same time.19 However, upon
appeal, the circuit court may only address the jurisdictional issue de
novo, while reviewing the equitable holdings for abuse of discretion.20
B.

The Medicare Appeals Process

Medicare is the United States’ federally controlled and funded,
single-payer health insurance plan for people age sixty-five or older, or
people under age sixty-five with certain disabilities.21 Through Medicare,
certified health-care providers such as hospitals and clinics apply for
reimbursement for providing services to qualifying patients for
qualifying procedures.22 When a provider sees a Medicare patient and
performs a billable test or procedure, the health-care provider then
submits a reimbursement claim to a Medicare Administrative
Contractor (“MAC”).23 RACs review the claims initially granted by a
MAC and revoke the claims if the test or procedure does not meet
Medicare’s “coding or medical necessity policies.”24 If a MAC or RAC
priority, . . . (5) the court should also take into account the nature and extent of the
interests prejudiced by delay, and . . . (6) the court need not “find any impropriety
lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that agency action is unreasonably
delayed.”
Id. (citations omitted) (first quoting Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. ICC, 702 F.2d 1026, 1034
(D.C. Cir. 1983); then quoting Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. FDA, 740 F.2d 21, 34
(D.C. Cir. 1984)).
19. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 686 F. Supp. 2d 55, 62 (D.D.C. 2010), rev’d on
other grounds and remanded, 642 F.3d 1145 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
20. See, e.g., In re Medicare Reimbursement Litig., 414 F.3d 7, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
21. Medicare Program—General Information, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS. (July 25, 2014), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-General-Information
/MedicareGenInfo/index.html [https://perma.cc/X9GK-H39T].
22. See Survey & Certification—Certification & Compliance, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS. (July 23, 2012), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Provider-Enrollment-andCertification/CertificationandComplianc/index.html?redirect=/certificationandcomplianc/02_ascs
.asp [https://perma.cc/892N-453A].
23. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395f(a), 1395h(a) (2015) (detailing procedures for filing for Part A
of Medicare, which covers hospital expenses); see also id. §§ 1395n(a), 1395u(a) (detailing
procedures for Medicare Part B, which provides medical insurance).
24. Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 1. Each procedure
must be “reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of an illness or injury[.]”
§ 1395y(a)(1)(A). The controversial “Two Midnight Rule” provides an example of when
providers can run afoul of Medicare’s coding policies, with some providers having claims
denied for filing them under Medicare Part A for inpatient care, when CMS decided they
should be classified as Medicare Part B for outpatient care. Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, CMS’
Proposed Changes to the Two-Midnight Rule: Partial Restoration of Medical Judgment,
HEALTH AFF.: BLOG (Sept. 1, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/09/01/cms-proposedchanges-to-the-two-midnight-rule-partial-restoration-of-medical-judgment/ [https://perma.cc
/NDU4-EHZF].
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denies the provider’s claim then the provider can ask for a
redetermination by the same MAC.25 Following a second denial, the
provider may then appeal to a Qualified Independent Contractor
(“QIC”) for redetermination.26 The QIC must then issue a decision
within sixty days of the appeal.27 If still unsatisfied, the health-care
provider may then appeal to a third level of review by requesting a
hearing from an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).28 ALJs must
render a decision within ninety days of the date that the provider
requested a hearing.29 The provider may then seek a fourth level of
review before the Departmental Appeals Board (“DAB”); the law also
requires the DAB to either return a decision or remand the case back to
an ALJ within ninety days.30 Similar to many final administrative
actions, DAB decisions may be appealed to a federal district court for
review of relevant questions of law,31 or the provider may escalate its
claim to the district court level if the DAB misses its deadline.32 At every
appellate stage, if HHS does not meet a deadline the provider may
escalate its claim to the next appellate level.33
C.

Cumberland County Hospital System v. Burwell

Neither Cumberland County nor American Hospital Ass’n
concerned appeals to the federal courts from denied payment claims.34
Instead, these cases involved hospital systems filing suit in federal
district court to compel the secretary of HHS to adjudicate its appeals
for Medicare reimbursement claims.35 In Cumberland County, the
hospital system had 750 outstanding appeals worth $12.3 million, some

25. § 1395ff(a)(3)(A) (2014).
26. Id. § 1395ff(c)(1).
27. Id. § 1395ff(c)(3)(C)(i).
28. Id. § 1395ff(d)(1)(A).
29. Id.
30. Id. § 1395ff(d)(2)(A).
31. Id. § 1395ff.
32. Id. § 1395ff(d)(3)(B). Only after an appeal to the DAB can providers seek judicial
review in Article III courts, and only if the amount in controversy is over $1,000. Id.
§ 1395ff(b)(2)(C), (b)(1)(E).
33. Id. § 1395ff(c)(3)(C)(ii), (d)(3)(A)–(B); 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.1104, 405.1108(d),
405.1132(b) (2016). To echo Judge Tatel’s apology to the reader, “We apologize to our
readers for all of the acronyms, but this is, after all, a Medicare case, and acronyms seem
integral to the parties’ native language.” Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 186 (D.C.
Cir. 2016).
34. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, 816 F.3d 48, 49 (4th Cir. 2016); Am.
Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 185.
35. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d at 49; Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 185.
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of which had been awaiting assignment to an ALJ for two years.36 In a
unanimous Fourth Circuit panel opinion authored by Judge Niemeyer,
the court affirmed the district court’s denial of mandamus for lack of
jurisdiction because the Medicare statute did not grant the plaintiff a
“clear and indisputable right to the relief sought[.]”37 The court reasoned
that when faced with a potentially long delay at the ALJ level, a healthcare provider may either escalate the claim to the DAB level or simply
wait it out.38 The court further found that the option for escalation
following a missed deadline indicated that Congress indeed “anticipated
that the [ninety]-day deadline might not be met.”39 The hospital system
argued that escalating its claim without receiving an ALJ hearing would
act as a “waive[r of] its right to due process.”40 The hospital’s grievance
focused on both DAB’s policy of denying a hearing unless the appeal
presented “extraordinary question[s] of law, policy or fact[]” and on
DAB’s remanding of each claim to the “back of [an] ever-growing ALJ
line.”41 Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit held that the hospital system did
not have a “clear and indisputable right” to a hearing within ninety days
and that either CMS or Congress should rectify the unfortunate appeals
backlog.42
D. American Hospital Association v. Burwell
In American Hospital Ass’n, the plaintiffs also sought mandamus to
compel HHS to comply with the ninety-day deadline for ALJ review of
their appeals.43 Appellants argued that escalation does not serve as an
36. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d at 50 (noting that the hospital’s claims had
already easily surpassed the ninety-day ALJ deadline). The plaintiffs have stated that most of
the $12.3 million in denied claims came from their inpatient rehabilitation facility, which
already takes a much higher percentage of Medicare patients than a normal hospital.
Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, No. 5:14-CV-508-BR, 2015 WL 1249959, at *3
(E.D.N.C. Mar. 18, 2015); What We Do, CAPE FEAR VALLEY HEALTH FOUND., http://www
.cfvfoundation.org/whatwedo.html [http://perma.cc/AXL4-ERCK]. The $12.3 million amount
is roughly equal to one year of revenue from that rehabilitation facility. Cumberland Cty.
Hosp. Sys., 2015 WL 1249959, at *3.
37. See Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d at 52 (quoting United States ex rel. Rahman
v. Oncology Assocs., P.C., 198 F.3d 502, 511 (4th Cir. 1999)); see also discussion infra Section
II.A.
38. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d at 55.
39. Id.
40. See id.
41. Brief for Appellant at 6, Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d 48 (No. 5:14-CV-508BR).
42. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d at 52, 57 (quoting United States ex rel. Rahman
v. Oncology Assocs., P.C., 198 F.3d 502, 511 (4th Cir. 1999)).
43. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 185 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Am. Hosp. Ass’n v.
Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 48 (D.D.C. 2014), rev’d and remanded, 812 F.3d 183 (D.C. Cir.
2016).
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adequate remedy given the rarity of DAB hearings and the large
backlog of appeals.44 Like the district court in Cumberland County,45 the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia denied the plaintiffs’
claim.46 However, on appeal, a unanimous D.C. Circuit panel reversed
and remanded.47 The D.C. Circuit agreed with plaintiffs’ argument and
held that escalation is not an adequate remedy to the missed deadlines,
because DAB hearings are rare and have their own large backlogs of
appeals as well.48 After concluding that “the statute imposes a clear duty
on the secretary to comply with the statutory deadlines,” the D.C.
Circuit remanded the case to the district court to balance the equities on
whether to grant mandamus relief.49 The district court then granted
mandamus for the plaintiffs, requiring HHS to formulate and comply
with a plan to completely eliminate the appeals backlog by the end of
2020, with yearly percentage benchmarks that the agency must meet
along the way.50 If, by January 1, 2021, there are still claims that have
been pending before ALJs for longer than one year, those claimants can
then petition a federal court for a declaratory judgment in their favor.51
Essentially, the two circuits disagreed on whether escalation was an
“adequate alternative remedy” for a mandamus claim.52 The Fourth
Circuit determined that mandamus relief was precluded by the
availability of escalation,53 whereas the D.C. Circuit concluded that
escalation was not an adequate remedy for missed deadlines.54 While
courts may treat the equities of enforcing agency deadlines differently,
escalation should not be considered an adequate alternative remedy in
the Medicare appeals context.55

44. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 191.
45. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, No. 5:14-CV-508-BR, 2015 WL 1249959,
at *10 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 18, 2015)
46. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 56.
47. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 183.
48. Id. at 191.
49. Id. at 192.
50. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 1:14-CV-00851, 2016 WL 7076983, at *3 (D.D.C.
Dec. 5, 2016).
51. Id. Although the consequence for failure to reach this 2021 goal is rather significant,
there are no apparent consequences if HHS fails to meet the yearly percentage goals. Id.
52. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 192; see Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell,
816 F.3d 48, 56 (4th Cir. 2016).
53. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d at 56.
54. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 192.
55. See infra Section II.B.
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II. TESTS AND REASONS BEHIND JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF
ADMINISTRATIVE DEADLINES
As stated before, mandamus is a drastic remedy, “invoked only in
extraordinary circumstances.”56 Even when a plaintiff proves mandamus
jurisdiction, courts have been reluctant to grant mandamus relief.57
Typically, they do not want to interfere with an agency’s prioritization of
limited resources or simply move one petitioner to the front of the
line—at the expense of others.58 Section A describes how courts have
treated mandamus claims in the agency delay context. Section B
concludes that mandamus is appropriate for hospitals awaiting their
appeals, because of the “systemic failure” of the Medicare appeals
system.
A. Justifications Courts Use to Enforce or Decline to Enforce Agency
Deadlines via Mandamus
Courts justify refusal to compel agency action because they are
generally unwilling to interfere with an agency’s prioritization of its
limited resources.59 If a plaintiff overcomes the jurisdictional bar to
mandamus, courts will often still find judicial enforcement of a deadline
to be inequitable.60 For instance, in In re Barr Laboratories, Inc.,61 Barr,
a drug manufacturer, sought to compel the Food and Drug
56. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 189 (quoting Power v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 781, 784 (D.C.
Cir. 2002)).
57. See infra Section II.A.
58. See infra Section II.A.
59. See Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton, 336 F.3d 1094, 1101 (D.C.
Cir. 2003) (“[T]he district court erred by disregarding the importance of there being
‘competing priorities’ for limited resources.”); In re Barr Labs., Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 76 (D.C. Cir.
1991).
60. See, e.g., Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, 336 F.3d at 1101–02; In re Barr Labs.,
930 F.2d at 76; In re Monroe Commc’ns Corp., 840 F.2d 942, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The court in
Cumberland County cited a Fourth Circuit case for the mandamus relief standard. See
Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, 816 F.3d 48, 52 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing United
States ex rel. Rahman v. Oncology Assocs., P.C., 198 F.3d 502, 511 (4th Cir. 1999)). Notably,
the court in Cumberland County relied on In re Barr Laboratories from the D.C. Circuit. See
id. at 56 (citing In re Barr Labs., 930 F.2d at 74–75). The D.C. Circuit occupies a uniquely
important place in administrative law, because most federal agencies are located within its
jurisdiction. See generally Eric M. Fraser et al., The Jurisdiction of the D.C. Circuit, 23
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 131 (2013) (examining the different causes for the D.C. Circuit’s
unique caseload, such as special treatment by Congress and geographic factors); John G.
Roberts, Jr., Lecture, What Makes the D.C. Circuit Different? A Historical View, 92 VA. L.
REV. 375 (2006) (summarizing the history of the D.C. Circuit); Patricia M. Wald et al., The
Contribution of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 507 (1988)
(chronicling the many instances throughout history when the D.C. Circuit substantially
affected the state of administrative law).
61. 930 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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Administration (“FDA”) to comply with a 180-day deadline for
approving Barr’s generic drug application.62 Although FDA admittedly
violated the statutory deadline, the D.C. Circuit refused to grant
mandamus.63 The court reasoned that granting mandamus would place
Barr “at the head of the queue[,] simply mov[ing] all others back one
space and produc[ing] no net gain.”64 Instead of a judicial order, the
court suggested legislative or administrative action: Congress could
earmark more funds for FDA or FDA could simplify the review
process.65
In another D.C. Circuit case, the court chose to afford the Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”) “great latitude” despite ongoing
delay.66 In re Monroe Communications Corp.67 involved a competing
television licensee applicant attempting to compel the FCC to decide
whether the current licensee had broadcast obscene material.68
Recognizing the FCC’s authority to set its own agenda, the court refused
to address arguments that the FCC had resolved other actions sooner
than the petitioner’s.69 The court further found that the issue was “a
delicate one, requiring the FCC to balance policy and constitutional
concerns,” which contributed to the court’s reluctance to compel agency
adjudication.70 Therefore, courts refuse to grant mandamus for agency
delay on either separation-of-powers grounds71 or due to an
unwillingness to rush particularly complex agency decisions.72
62. Id. at 73–74. To put the deadline violation in context, FDA took roughly double the
allotted time for most applications, and up to quadruple the allotted time for certain
applications. Id. at 74. In contrast, the most recent HHS report showed an average wait time
of 877 days for an ALJ hearing, almost ten times the statutory deadline. See Average
Processing Time by Fiscal Year, DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www
.hhs.gov/about/agencies/omha/about/current-workload/average-processing-time-by-fiscal-year
/index.html [http://perma.cc/8QCU-Z349].
63. In re Barr Labs., 930 F.2d at 76.
64. Id. at 75. For another case justifying a denial of mandamus in order to thwart linejumping, see Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, 336 F.3d at 1101.
65. In re Barr Labs., 930 F.2d at 76.
66. In re Monroe Commc’ns Corp., 840 F.2d 942, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Although the FCC
was not subject to any firm deadlines, the proceedings had well eclipsed the suggested
timelines given in the statute and Senate reports. Id. at 945.
67. 840 F.2d 942 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
68. Id. at 943–44.
69. Id. at 946 (“Further, we must give agencies great latitude in determining their
agendas . . . .”); see also Med. Comm. For Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 674–75 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (giving the SEC substantial deference for setting its agenda), vacated, 404 U.S. 403
(1972).
70. In re Monroe Commc’ns, 840 F.2d at 946.
71. See Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton, 336 F.3d 1094, 1101 (D.C.
Cir. 2003); In re Barr Labs., Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
72. See In re Monroe Commc’ns, 840 F.2d at 946; Orion Reserves Ltd. P’ship v.
Kempthorne, 516 F. Supp. 2d 8, 15–17 (D.D.C. 2007) (ruling that the Bureau of Land
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Courts have, however, granted mandamus in some circumstances,
but each case involves a very fact-intensive inquiry. If there is a showing
of bias or impropriety, then courts are more willing to grant
mandamus.73 Absent any bias in the administrative delay, courts are
reluctant to intervene unless the administrative systems are significantly
failing to function as Congress intended74 or are failing to follow a
previous court order.75
For example, in Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. Civil Aeronautics Board,76
the D.C. Circuit mandated that the Civil Aeronautics Board (“CAB”)
hear cases that had been pending before it for five years.77 The Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978 required CAB to provide unemployment
benefits to airline employees who were laid off as a result of the major
regulatory changes CAB enacted.78 In the Act’s five-year history, CAB
held only one hearing and did not issue any dispositions.79 The court
decided that this delay was unreasonable and required CAB to “report
to [the D.C. Circuit] on its progress in these cases every [thirty] days[.]”80
Management’s nine-year delay in processing Orion’s oil shale mining claims was not
unreasonable, given the substantial amount of work required to process each claim); see also
Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60 ADMIN. L. REV.
1, 19 (2008) (“[C]ourts might well conclude that . . . they are just not well suited to the task of
regularly supervising and monitoring large organizations.”).
73. See, e.g., Sandoz, Inc. v. Leavitt, 427 F. Supp. 2d 29, 39–40 (D.D.C. 2006). In a factual
pattern almost identical to that in In re Barr Labs., the court granted mandamus for a generic
drug application because plaintiff drug manufacturer showed that the agency may have
singled them out and that expediting their application would not adversely affect any other
drug applications. Id.; see In re Barr Labs., 930 F.2d at 76 (“Where the agency has manifested
bad faith, as by singling someone out for bad treatment or asserting utter indifference to a
congressional deadline, the agency will have a hard time claiming legitimacy for its
priorities.”).
74. See Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int’l v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 750 F.2d 81, 85–86 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (holding that “claims of unreasonable delay fall within a narrow class of interlocutory
appeals from agency action over which we appropriately should exercise our jurisdiction” and
requiring the agency report its progress in reviewing a backlog of wrongful termination
complaints to the court every thirty days).
75. See In re People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran, 680 F.3d 832, 838 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding
it will grant mandamus if the Secretary of State did not issue the reasoning behind a decision,
which the D.C. Circuit had ordered two years prior, within four months); In re Core
Commc’ns, 531 F.3d 849, 861–62 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (granting mandamus for the FCC’s sevenyear delay in responding to a court order, requiring the agency to rescind and replace an old
rule).
76. 750 F.2d 81 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
77. Id. at 86–87.
78. See Airline Deregulation Act, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 43, 92 Stat. 1705, 1750–53 (1978)
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 1371) (requiring the CAB to provide benefits to
employees whose employment was terminated due to the other regulatory changes enacted in
the Airline Deregulation Act).
79. Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int’l, 750 F.2d at 85.
80. Id. at 88–89.
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Here, the court focused on the unreasonable delays felt by all claimants,
and not just the delays felt by the plaintiff, as the Barr Laboratories
court did.81 In shifting its focus from one claimant to the whole system,
the court disregarded the common line-jumping or resource allocation
arguments. In effect, the court’s mandamus order simply addressed the
unreasonable delays felt by all of the potential parties with claims under
the Act in question. In doing so, the court avoided the separation of
powers and complex agency decisions issues highlighted above.
B.

Applying Mandamus to Agency Deadlines

The escalation provision, which is unique to Medicare appeals,
separates this system from those involved in the bulk of other
mandamus cases regarding agency delay.82 In the absence of an
escalation provision, a person or organization delayed beyond an agency
deadline has no formal recourse; the only recourse is to wait.83 However,
in the Medicare appeals context, statutes permit providers to escalate
their claim to the next level.84 The Fourth Circuit and D.C. Circuit
disagreed on the role that the escalation option plays in the mandamus
analysis: the Fourth Circuit viewed escalation as part of a “coherent
regulatory scheme” that must be interpreted in context;85 the D.C.
Circuit held that escalation is an “inadequate” alternative remedy.86
Nonetheless, neither opinion sufficiently explains what makes a remedy
adequate, or what effect a “coherent regulatory scheme” has on the
availability of mandamus relief.87
These two opinions reflect the state of federal mandamus
jurisprudence. Federal courts have denied mandamus jurisdiction in
cases where there was a clear alternative method available to accomplish

81. Id.; In re Barr Labs., Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 74 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
82. See, e.g., In re Core Commc’ns, 531 F.3d 849, 858–60 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (granting
mandamus to compel the FCC to comply with a previous mandamus order granted seven
years prior); In re United Mine Workers of Am. Int’l Union, 190 F.3d 545, 550 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (remarking that the Mine Safety and Health Administration had a rule pending final
decision for eight years after the comment period ended); In re Barr Labs., 930 F.2d at 74
(noting that FDA simply has a 180-day deadline to issue a decision for drug applications,
without giving applicants any other recourse).
83. See In re Barr Labs., 930 F.2d at 74.
84. See supra Section I.B.
85. See Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, 816 F.3d 48, 52, 56 (4th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 569 (1995)).
86. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 192 (D.C. Cir. 2016). The court does note
that, although the availability of escalation does not preclude mandamus jurisdiction, it could
weigh against mandamus when addressing the equities. Id.
87. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d at 56 (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513
U.S. 561, 569 (1995)).
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the same result sought by mandamus.88 The Supreme Court has held that
even “costly and inconvenient” alternative remedies can preclude
mandamus relief.89 If the substantive right sought by the mandamus
action is available through an alternative means, then mandamus is
generally unavailable.90 Federal courts have not substantially developed
the “adequate” prong of the phrase “adequate alternative remed[ies]”;91
indeed, they seem more focused on whether the remedy actually
safeguards the substantive right instead of worrying whether any
procedural rights were lost as a result of the alternative remedy.92
In the Medicare appeals context, the option to escalate a claim
presents a unique problem for the “adequate alternative remedy”
analysis.93 American Hospital Ass’n turned on the “systemic failure” of
the Medicare appeals system that “causes virtually all appeals to be
decided well after the statutory deadlines.”94 Judge Tatel acknowledged
that “in isolated or occasional cases,” escalation could serve as an
adequate alternative remedy, and that its inclusion “indicate[d] that
Congress anticipated that [delay] might occur with some measure of
regularity.”95 However, the opinion concluded that escalating to the
DAB would be an inadequate remedy in this situation, due to the
DAB’s own significant backlog and its discretionary review of cases.96

88. Mukand Int’l, Ltd. v. United States, 502 F.3d 1366, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting that
the plaintiff could have sought “similar injunctive relief”); Power v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 781,
784 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (noting that the fee petition process was an adequate alternative method
for seeking remedy); Barnhart v. Devine, 771 F.2d 1515, 1524 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (noting that
appellants “should have sought recourse through the Office of Special Counsel”).
89. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 30 (1943) (holding that mandamus
could not be used to require a district court judge to reinstate a plea in abatement, even
though the petitioners would have to complete the underlying trial before being able to
appeal the abatement).
90. See In re al-Nashiri, 791 F.3d 71, 78 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Power, 292 F.3d at 787.
91. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 189.
92. See United States ex rel. Girard Tr. Co. v. Helvering, 301 U.S. 540, 544 (1937) (“[T]he
writ of mandamus may not be employed to secure the adjudication of a disputed right for
which an ordinary suit affords a remedy equally adequate, and complete.”); Carter v.
Seamans, 411 F.2d 767, 773 (5th Cir. 1969) (“[T]he alternative remedy must be adequate, i.e.,
capable of affording full relief as to the very subject matter in question.”). State mandamus
jurisprudence has provided more robust guarantees in procedural rights through mandamus.
See Southern LNG, Inc. v. MacGinnitie, 755 S.E.2d 683, 685 (Ga. 2014) (“[The] alternative
legal remedy must be ‘equally convenient, complete and beneficial’ to the petitioner.”
(quoting N. Fulton Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Roach, 453 S.E.2d 463, 466 (Ga. 1995))); In re Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004) (granting mandamus when necessary to
“preserve important substantive and procedural rights from impairment or loss”).
93. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 189.
94. Id. at 191.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 192.
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This line of reasoning introduces a seemingly equitable consideration
into a decision that is supposed to be strictly legal in nature.97
Mandamus relief is an “extraordinary remedy[.]”98 While courts are
reluctant to grant mandamus for agency inaction in cases involving an
agency’s resource allocation decisions or particularly difficult questions,
courts have found mandamus jurisdiction in cases involving a “systemic
failure” of the agency to operate as Congress intended.99 This systemic
failure occurs when insufficient funding completely overburdens the
alternative remedies otherwise available.100 If a “systemic failure”
occurs, fixing that failure requires much more than a judicial writ; it
requires two, or all three, branches of the government to work to solve
the problem at hand.101
III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE MEDICARE APPEALS BACKLOG
All parties involved in Cumberland County102 and American
Hospital Ass’n103 agree that the Medicare appeals backlog problem poses
a “heavy financial burden” for providers104 and places “the
administrative process” in “grave condition.”105 To fix such a widereaching problem, multiple branches of the federal government must
play significant roles in restructuring the overburdened administrative
system. This Part identifies steps available to each branch of government
for reducing backlogged Medicare appeals and considers their potential
consequences.
Section A explains that Congress is in the best position to fix the
backlog, through providing more funding for OMHA or by restructuring
97. Id. at 189–90; see supra Section I.A. This reasoning, of course, passes over the
important question of how to identify a “systemic failure[.]” Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 191.
It is fair to assume, for the purposes of this problem, that an average delay of almost ten times
the statutory deadline constitutes a “systemic failure[.]” Id.
98. In re People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran, 680 F.3d 832, 836 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting In
re Core Commc’ns, 531 F.3d 849, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2008)); Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr.
v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, 816
F.3d 48, 52 (4th Cir. 2016); Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 189.
99. See supra Section II.B.
100. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 191.
101. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 1:14-CV-00851, 2016 WL 5106997, at *8 (D.D.C.
Sept. 19, 2016) (“The Court, however, does not possess a magic wand that, when waved, will
eliminate the backlog.”).
102. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, No. 5:14-CV-508-BR, 2015 WL 1249959
(E.D.N.C. Mar. 18, 2015).
103. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 1:14-CV-00851, 2016 WL 5106997 (D.D.C. Sept. 19,
2016).
104. Cumberland Cty., 2015 WL 1249959, at *10; see Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 2016 WL 5106997,
at *4.
105. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d at 57.
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the appeals framework. Congressional action may be ineffectual,
however, due to the political pressures that may slow its response.
Section B addresses HHS’s role in the backlog and concludes that the
agency cannot entirely fix the backlog on its own. Section C addresses
the role of the judiciary: mandamus should only be granted in the most
egregious circumstances of agency delay. This Part concludes that the
D.C. district court was correct in granting mandamus, because Congress
demonstrated its inability or unwillingness to act and HHS failed to
uphold the Medicare appeals system as envisioned by Congress.106
A. Legislative Action
To ensure providers’ procedural rights are enforced through the
appeals process without diminishing the scope or effectiveness of the
RAC program, Congress should increase funding for OMHA and ALJ
appeals. Congress contributed to this problem by requiring CMS to
implement the RAC program without significantly increasing OMHA
funding, and Congress is therefore in a good position to remedy the
shortfall.107 With increased funding, OMHA could hire more ALJs to
decrease the backlog at a much faster rate. If Congress fails to increase
OMHA funding, HHS will have to take drastic action, significantly
altering both its appeals process and the RAC program.108 Alternatively,
Congress could alleviate the appeals backlog by altering the nature of
the appeals process or the RAC program itself.
Even though congressional action is the most desirable solution,
significant legislative reform seems unlikely.109 In September 2016, the
D.C. district court denied the government’s motion for a stay due to its
serious doubts that any legislative fix was forthcoming.110 HHS argued
that the President’s proposed budget for fiscal year (“FY”) 2017, along
with the proposed Audit & Appeals Fairness, Integrity, and Reforms in
106. See infra Section III.C.
107. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 3, at 6. OMHA’s
appropriations have increased from $72 million to $82 million from fiscal year (“FY”) 2012 to
FY 2014, while the number of appeals have increased from 117,068 in FY 2012 to 474,063 in
FY 2014. Id. The amount of overpayments collected by RACs, and concurrently the number
of appeals, decreased significantly in FY 2015, largely due to HHS’s decision to temporarily
prohibit RACs from performing inpatient hospital patient status reviews, where the RAC
reviews whether a patient should be considered inpatient or outpatient. See CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 2, at v. Even with this sharp reduction, the ALJ
level of appeals still received twice as many appeals as it processed in FY 2015. U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 3, at 4.
108. See infra Section III.B.
109. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 1:14-CV-00851, 2016 WL 5106997, at *7 (D.D.C.
Sept. 19, 2016).
110. Id. at *8.
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Medicare Act (“AFIRM Act”), would alleviate much of the backlog
without any drastic agency action necessary.111 However, the court
declined to give the possibility of any legislation much weight in its
analysis.112 In Congress’s FY 2017 proposed budget, the Senate version
would increase OMHA’s budget by $5 million—only a 5% increase from
the previous year—even though OMHA requested a $143 million
increase in order to combat the backlog.113 Similarly, the budget
proposal from the House of Representatives did not include any
increase in OMHA funding.114 The AFIRM Act, which would have
created a new class of “Medicare Magistrates” to assist appeals, did not
move beyond the Senate Finance Committee after it was introduced in
December 2015.115
All of this underscores the unreliability of depending on
congressional action to solve serious agency problems. Relying on
legislative funding to honor administrative deadlines can be difficult
because the coalition that passed the legislation to begin with may be
stripped of power or otherwise dissolved over time.116 For a relatively
nonpartisan issue like Medicare appeals, this may not appear to pose a
threat to congressional enforcement. However, the RAC program’s
implementation and the exponential rise in appeals also coincidentally
occurred during what, by some metrics, were two of the most
unproductive congressional sessions in this country’s recent history.117 In
both district court cases for Cumberland County and American Hospital
111. Id. at *7; see Audit & Appeals Fairness, Integrity, and Reforms in Medicare Act of
2015, S. 2368, 114th Cong., at 1 (2015) (stating that the purpose of the bill is “to improve the
efficiency of the Medicare appeals process”); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2017, at 138 (2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2017/assets/budget.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DA9A-5ZKN].
112. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 2016 WL 5106997, at *7–8.
113. See S. 3040, 114th Cong., at 82 (2016); HHS FY 2017 Budget in Brief—OMHA, U.S.
DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/about/budget/fy2017/budget-in-brief
/omha/index.html [http://perma.cc/6XSE-38ZW].
114. See H.R. 5926, 114th Cong., at 82 (2016).
115. See Audit & Appeals Fairness, Integrity, and Reforms in Medicare Act of 2015, S.
2368, 114th Cong., at 4 (2015); Audit & Appeals Fairness, Integrity, and Reforms in Medicare
Act of 2015: Introduction to S. 2368 Before the S. Fin. Comm., 114th Cong. (Dec. 8, 2015).
116. See Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 245 (1983).
117. See Cristina Marcos & Ramsey Cox, Historically Unproductive Congress Ends, HILL
(Dec. 16, 2014), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/227365-historically-unproductivecongress-ends [http://perma.cc/XA8S-ZRNL]. But see Glenn Kessler, Harry Reid’s Claim
That the Current Senate Is “the Most Unproductive” in U.S. History, WASH. POST: FACT
CHECKER (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/12/08
/harry-reids-claim-that-the-current-senate-is-the-most-unproductive-in-u-s-history/ [http://
perma.cc/J7WD-26J2].
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Ass’n, which addressed the appeals backlog from late 2014 and early
2015, the courts recognized that Congress was aware of the problem and
was working to address it.118 In the two years since the first opinion,
Congress has yet to increase funding or to alter the structure of the
Medicare appeals process in any way.119 Clearly, Congress failed to
adequately respond to backlogged Medicare appeals. Because of
congressional inaction, OMHA remains “in an untenable position”
created by the confluence of increased appeals and stagnant funding.120
B.

Agency Action

If Congress will not act, then HHS must take corrective measures to
comply with the statutory framework. To HHS’s credit, the agency
implemented several steps to address the backlog during the course of
the American Hospital Ass’n litigation, such as offering to settle any
pending appeals for sixty-six percent of the amount of the claims121 and
proposing a system to evaluate and incentivize each RAC based on an
accuracy score.122 However, in the D.C. district court’s denial of HHS’s
motion for a year-long stay, Judge Boasberg determined that the
proposed administrative changes would not make any “significant
progress toward a solution.”123 Although the proposed increase in
settlements, introduction of alternative adjudicatory procedures, and
alterations to the RAC program would result in fifty percent fewer
backlogged OMHA appeals by FY 2020 than if HHS had taken no
action, these changes would not affect the hundreds of thousands of
appeals that are already backlogged.124 Moreover, one of the proposed
changes, requiring prior authorization for certain items or services,
would actually impose new procedural hurdles for providers.125
HHS’s inability to propose meaningful and significant changes
underscores the primary limitation of relying on only agency action: the
constraints placed on the agency by Congress restrict its ability to make
drastic and wholesale changes in agency procedure. Although HHS’s

118. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, No. 5:14-CV-508-BR, 2015 WL 1249959,
at *9 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 18, 2015); Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 55 (D.D.C.
2014), rev’d and remanded, 812 F.3d 183 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
119. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 1:14-CV-00851, 2016 WL 5106997, at *7 (D.D.C.
Sept. 19, 2016).
120. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 187 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
121. Supplemental Declaration of Ellen Murray at 8, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, __ F.
Supp. 3d __ (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2016) (No. 1:14-CV-00851), 2016 WL 5106997.
122. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 2, at 10.
123. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 2016 WL 5106997, at *6.
124. Id.
125. See id.
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proposed changes did not extend to the outer boundaries of its statutory
constraints,126 any further changes may compromise the integrity of the
appeals process or RAC program and would likely contravene the
congressional intent of curbing Medicare overpayments.127
HHS argues that it is unable to satisfy these two competing
interests: guaranteeing certain procedural rights for providers’ appeals
on one hand128 and implementing the RAC program to reduce Medicare
overpayments on the other.129 Although it would be preferable from a
principal-agent perspective for the agency to wait to receive guidance
from Congress on how to balance those competing priorities,130 HHS
may be able to infer congressional intent based on the amount of
procedural requirements in place under both statutory mandates. While
Congress has provided explicit procedural rights by including deadlines
for each level of appeal,131 the RAC statute provides HHS with much
more discretion to determine its scope.132 Therefore, in this context,
HHS should ensure that the Medicare appeals process meets its

126. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ddd(h) (2015); Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 2016 WL 5106997, at *7. The
American Hospital Association, in its motion for summary judgment, proposed that the
secretary implement harsher penalties on RACs with high reversal rates and shortening the
“lookback period” during which RACs can review payments. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment & Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support at 10–11, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v.
Burwell, __ F. Supp. 3d __ (D.D.C. Oct. 14, 2016) (No. 1:14-CV-00851), 2016 WL 5106997.
Both of those proposals would fit within the statutory constraints of the RAC program. See
§ 1395ddd(h)(1) (mandating that the secretary “enter into contracts” with RACs under the
Medicare Integrity Program); § 13955ddd(h)(4) (limiting the lookback period to no more than
four years prior).
127. See § 1395ddd(h)(1) (instructing the HHS secretary to enter into contracts with
recovery audit contractors to “recoup[] overpayments” made for all Medicare programs).
128. See supra Section I.B. In its briefs throughout the entire litigation against American
Hospital Association, HHS has stressed the difficulty of its task to reduce the backlog without
congressional support. See, e.g., Brief for the Appellee at 17, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812
F.3d 183 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (No. 15-5015) (“Congress has not provided the resources needed to
adjudicate claims within the timetable contemplated by the Medicare statute. Several
members of Congress have explicitly recognized that this is the case, and plaintiffs do not
seriously contend otherwise.”). The agency raised an argument of impossibility in its motion
for the D.C. district court to reconsider granting mandamus. Defendant’s Motion for
Reconsideration & Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support at 2, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v.
Burwell, __ F. Supp. 3d __ (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 2016) (No. 1:14-CV-00851), 2016 WL 5106997.
129. See § 1395ddd(h)(1); Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 186.
130. See generally Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio, Agency Delays: How A Principal-Agent
Approach Can Inform Judicial and Executive Branch Review of Agency Foot-Dragging, 79
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1381 (2011) (examining the treatment of agency delay by the judicial
and executive branches from a principal-agent approach).
131. § 1395ff(a)(2), (c)(3)(C), (d)(1)(A), (d)(2)(A).
132. See id. § 1395ddd(h)(1) (“[T]he Secretary shall enter into contracts with recovery
audit contractors in accordance with this subsection for the purpose of identifying
underpayments and overpayments and recouping overpayments . . . .”).
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statutory minimum requirements before HHS continues to operate the
RAC program beyond its legally required minimum.
However, although HHS has more clear responsibilities regarding
the appeals process, there are also clearer opportunities for enforcement
of those responsibilities, as seen in the recent litigation.133 Judicial review
of deadlines is much easier to obtain than substantive review of the
scope of an agency’s adoption of a certain program.134 A plaintiff who
wished to challenge the underimplementation of the RAC program
would likely face standing problems in federal court.135 Therefore, the
only possible protection for the RAC program would be congressional
action, which can be unreliable given the current political state.136
Although extrapolating congressional intent from the constraints put on
agency discretion can be a useful tool, Congress clearly intended the
RAC program to encompass more than just a token collection of
contractors to meet the statutory minimum requirements.137 Therefore,
given the difficulty of enforcing congressional intent for the RAC
program, it is important to maintain the efficacy of the RAC program as
much as possible while emphasizing the statutory guarantees afforded to
providers through the Medicare appeals system.
C.

Judicial Action

The most crucial step for a mandamus claim against agency inaction
is deciding whether to address the rights of only the plaintiffs or the
rights of all participants in the administrative system. The Fourth Circuit
focused on the resource allocation problem, reasoning that this problem
would best be solved by “the political branches[,]” and therefore denied

133. See supra Section II.B.
134. See Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 923, 932 (2008).
135. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500–01 (1975). A plaintiff challenging the
underimplementation of the RAC program would not likely satisfy standing requirements for
a “distinct and palpable injury[.]” See id. at 501. The only group of possible litigants who could
be injured by the underimplementation of the RAC program would be health-care providers,
since RACs are tasked with finding underpayments as well as overpayments. § 1395ddd(h)(1).
Given the unpopularity of the RAC program among most health-care providers, it is highly
unlikely that any provider would actually file suit. See Bob Herman, RACs Recouped $3B for
Medicare in 2013, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www
.modernhealthcare.com/article/20140929/NEWS/309299939 [https://perma.cc/9LMJ-TBZX]
(reporting the high overturn rates for RACs in 2013).
136. See supra Section III.A.
137. See Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 1 (announcing
Congress’s expansion of the three-year, six-state RAC pilot program to all fifty states).
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mandamus to the hospital plaintiff.138 In contrast, the D.C. Circuit
treated this case as a suit against the Medicare appeals process in
general, rather than one in favor of just one or a few hospitals, as the
Fourth Circuit did.139 This shift in focus allowed the D.C. Circuit, and the
district court on remand, to concentrate on the statutory obligations of
HHS as a whole rather than confining their analyses to the status of one
hospital’s appeals.
Courts should allow Congress the opportunity to fix systemic
Medicare appeals backlogs, especially if Congress has indicated its intent
to do so.140 Courts recognize that Congress is much better equipped than
the judiciary to reshape an entire administrative procedural system, such
as the Medicare appeals process, and therefore courts aim to give
Congress proper deference.141 The district court for the District of
Columbia afforded Congress an appropriate amount of deference: in its
2014 denial of mandamus, the court viewed the possibility of
congressional action as a factor weighing against mandamus.142 Two
years later, the court more pessimistically noted that “Congress is
unlikely to play the role of the cavalry here, riding to the rescue of the
Secretary’s besieged program.”143 The prospect of congressional action
only remains a compelling factor for mandamus as long as Congress
appears willing and able to address the underlying problem.144 However,
once Congress is clearly unwilling or unable to make corrective changes,
courts should affirmatively enforce statutory rights.145
Although judicial enforcement can be a powerful force when
utilized, it sometimes suffers from procedural delays typically
138. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, 816 F.3d 48, 57 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting
Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, No. 5:14-CV-508-BR, 2015 WL 1249959, at *10
(E.D.N.C. Mar. 18, 2015)); see supra Section I.C.
139. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 192 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he complaint
also requests the broader relief of ‘requiring HHS to otherwise comply with its statutory
obligations in administering the appeals process for all hospitals.’ ”)
140. See, e.g., Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 55 (D.D.C. 2014) (noting that
“Congress is aware of the inundation of appeals”), rev’d and remanded, 812 F.3d 183 (D.C.
Cir. 2016).
141. See Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 130, at 1431.
142. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 55.
143. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 1:14-CV-00851, 2016 WL 5106997, at *8 (D.D.C.
Sept. 19, 2016).
144. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 193 (“[T]he clarity of the statutory duty likely will
require issuance of the writ if the political branches have failed to make meaningful progress
within a reasonable period of time . . . .”); Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 2016 WL 5106997, at *4 (“[T]he
force of Congress’s knowledge and ability to act as a reason to deny mandamus diminishes
with the passage of time absent meaningful legislative action, particularly as the backlog and
delays have worsened.”).
145. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803) (“[E]very right, when
withheld, must have a remedy . . . .”).
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experienced by the other political branches.146 As noted by
commentators, “[t]he [federal] judiciary is not known for its expeditious
decisionmaking[,]”147 even though it is generally insulated from political
pressures that can delay the other two branches.148 In American Hospital
Ass’n, for example, the D.C. district court granted mandamus in
December 2016, two and a half years after the plaintiffs filed their
complaint.149 Waiting two and a half years for relief would not be
considered particularly expedient, especially considering some hospitals
had approximately one year’s worth of revenues tied up in the appeals
process.150 However, because the court was separated from the evenslower Congress, Judge Boasberg was able to grant mandamus to begin
to quell the Medicare appeals backlog.151
In addition to some procedural slowness, the remedies available to
the courts are much more limited than those available to the other
branches of government.152 Courts can issue writs of mandamus,
prescribe new judicial deadlines, or simply order that an agency “act
expeditiously.”153 In its mandamus order, the D.C. district court imposed
a timetable that requires HHS to decrease the backlog by a certain
percentage each year.154 Although the court will be able to enter default
judgments for claims still significantly backlogged after 2020, there are
no penalties if HHS does not meet each yearly goal.155 This serves as a
perfect example of the courts’ role in enforcing administrative deadlines:
after years of hard-fought litigation, the final judicial order is only a part
of the overall solution. The judicial branch may not have the flexibility
or responsiveness of the political branches, but it serves as a vital
backstop to enforce administrative deadlines and guarantee procedural
rights to those interacting with the administrative state.

146. Professor Sant’Ambrogio views judicial enforcement of an agency’s statutory
responsibilities as “[a] core responsibility of the judiciary.” See Sant’Ambrogio, supra note
130, at 1431.
147. Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 130, at 1430. Nationwide, fourteen percent of civil district
court cases have been pending for at least three years. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS—FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT
STATISTICS 1 (June 30, 2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/20172/download [http://perma.cc
/8S5T-STS9].
148. Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 130, at 1430.
149. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 1:14-CV-00851, 2016 WL 7076983, at *1 (D.D.C.
Dec. 5, 2016).
150. See supra Section I.C.
151. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 2016 WL 7076983, at *3.
152. Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 130, at 1431.
153. Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 134, at 964–66.
154. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 2016 WL 7076983, at *3.
155. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Administrative procedure is viewed by scholars as a way for
congressional coalitions to exert lasting power over agency action.156 The
coalition that enacted the Medicare appeals framework included
deadlines to guarantee providers a baseline for procedural rights.
However, just as a competing congressional mandate’s effects were
beginning to impact those procedural rights, Congress became
simultaneously mired in one of the most divisive and unproductive
periods in history.157 Because the coalition that originally enacted the
Medicare appeals process has long dissolved, the duty to enforce those
procedural rights falls to HHS and the courts. Given that an efficient
administrative state is faithful to the intent of the enacting coalition, the
D.C. Circuit was correct in finding mandamus jurisdiction. By
addressing the Medicare appeals process as a whole instead of just the
rights of one provider, and accurately viewing the escalation provision as
a non-viable “alternative remedy,”158 the D.C. Circuit served the
important role of protecting statutorily granted procedural rights,
ensuring that the costs of health-care reform are not distributed
disproportionately—a result that would be counter to the intent of the
legislation.
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